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Abstract 
 
Previous papers find no relationship between interest rates and the discounts of US 
closed-end funds before 1985.  This is taken as evidence against management fees being 
a cause of discounts because a negative relationship is expected: if interest rates rise, you 
would expect to see discounts fall as the present value of future fees is reduced. But from 
1985 forward, there has been a strong positive relationship between interest rates and 
fees.  This supports an alternative view in which the discount varies positively with 
interest rates because bond yields are an alternative return against which closed-end funds 
must compete. 
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 1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 Closed-end funds are actively managed investment vehicles that differ from 
mutual funds in two important ways.  First, they do not redeem their own shares at par 
with their portfolio values.  Instead, their shares trade on major stock exchanges where 
supply and demand determine their prices.  Second, they voluntarily release their net 
asset values once per week.  Each fund’s net asset value (NAV) is simply the value of its 
assets less its liabilities and represents the fund’s fundamental value because if the fund 
were to liquidate immediately, its NAV would be distributed to its shareholders.    
 
 These two characteristics of closed-end funds enable a very direct test of arbitrage 
pricing and the Law of One Price.  You simply compare fund share prices with the per-
share value of fund NAVs.  If you do so, you discover the infamous fact that the two 
values are only rarely equal.   
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 The observed differences are traditionally expressed as discounts or premia 
relative to per-share NAV.  To formalize, suppose that a fund’s price at time t is Pt and its 
NAV per share at time t is Nt. Then the discount or premium at which it trades at time t is 
defined as Dt = Nt/Pt - 1. Values of Dt > 0 are referred to as discounts while values of Dt 
< 0 are referred to as premia.  In addition, please note that I will multiply Dt by 100 in 
order to express discounts and premia in percents.   
  
 Large differences between share prices and portfolio values of are not uncommon, 
with discounts of 20% and premia of -20% being routinely observed. Truly extreme 
mispricings are rather rare, but it should be noted that among the 458 US funds examined 
here from 1985 to 2001, the maximum discount was 66.5% while the maximum premium 
was -205.4%.   
 
 The moderate discounts and premia that are routinely observed suggest at least 
some sort of violation of the Law of One Price, while the extreme values that are more 
occasionally observed are very hard to square with any sort of rational pricing.  This has 
led to a large body of papers examining whether discounts and premia can be explained 
rationally.  The debate is surveyed by Dimson and Minio-Kozerski (1999), and empirical 
results are mixed, with some papers finding support for one or more of the explanatory 
hypotheses while others reject them or find no support for them. 
 
 One rejected hypothesis has to do with whether management fees affect Dt levels.  
The test for this has been to see whether Dt values move inversely with interest rates. The 
rationale for the test is that if the markets were in the habit of reducing the share price of 
a fund below its NAV per share by the present value of expected future management fees, 
then if interest rates were to go up, the present value of future fees would fall, thereby 
leading to a smaller discount.   
 
 Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler (1991) are the first to reject this hypothesis based on 
finding no relationship between unexpected changes in the term structure of interest rates 
and the average Dt levels across US stock funds between 1965 and 1985.  Pontiff (1996) 
directly regresses Dt values on interest rates for the same 1965-1985 period and again 
finds no relationship.  In addition, Gemmill and Thomas (2002) also find no relationship 
for UK data over the period 1991-1997.  But as I demonstrate, there is a robust positive 
relationship between Dt and interest rates in US data after 1985.  While this later positive 
relationship is also inconsistent with interest rates affecting Dt by changing the present 
value of future management fees, it is consistent with an alternative explanation for Dt 
levels suggested by Flynn (2002).   
 
 
 2. THE DATA 
 
 The data comes from the Fund Edge data set of US closed-end funds published by 
Weisenberger Thompson Financial.  The data covers all 458 US closed-end funds trading 
in June 2001, with historical data of daily prices and weekly NAVs for each fund going 
back to each fund’s inception.  The data set suffers from survival bias, but is much larger 
than any other data set used to study the relationship between interest rates and Dt levels.  
For instance, Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler (1991) use just 20 funds from 1965-1985, while 
Pontiff (1996) uses only 52 funds covering 1965-1985.  For a complete description of the 
data set, see Flynn (2005). 
 
 
 3. INTEREST RATES AND DISCOUNTS IN THE US AFTER 1985 
 
 The positive relationship between interest rates and Dt levels is clearly visible in 
Figure 1, which plots yields on 1-year US Treasuries on the same graph as the average Dt 
level across all funds in operation each month between January 1985 and May 2001.  As 
you can see, the two series move positively nearly all the time, with the only major 
exception being the sharp increase in the average Dt level in mid-1990 at a time when 
interest rates were falling.  However, please note that this anomaly is easily explained as 
being the result of the financial market turmoil caused by Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait that 
summer.  
 
Figure 1. Interest rates and the average discount of US closed-end funds, 1985-2001. 
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 The time series regressions summarized in Table 1 confirm the statistical 
significance of the positive relationship between interest rates and average Dt levels. 
Columns (1) and (2) present, respectively, regressions of the levels and first differences 
of 1-year Treasury yields on the levels and first differences of the average Dt series. For 
both regressions, an AR(1) process was used to account for serial correlation, and t-
statistics are given in parentheses. 
 
   As you can see, levels regression (1) shows that a one-percentage point increase 
in interest rates causes a highly statistically significant 2.26 percent increase in the 
average Dt level.  The first differences regression (2) strongly confirms this positive 
relationship, with a one-percentage point increase in interest rates leading to a highly 
statistically significant 2.32 percent increase in average Dt levels.  In addition, please note 
that the AR(1) error correction is insignificant in first differences regression (2), 
indicating that no error correction method is needed.  Consequently, you can run a simple 
OLS regression for the first differences of the two variables.  If you do so, the R-squared 
is 0.158, indicating that nearly 16% of the first differences of the average Dt series are 
explained by first differences of 1-year Treasury yields.  
 
 
 
Table 1. Time Series Regressions in levels and first differences of 1-Year US 
Treasury Yields on the Average Discount or Premium (Dt) of US Closed-end Funds, 
January 1985 to May 2001. 
 
 (1) (2) 
Dependent Variable Level of Avg. Dt Change in Avg. Dt 
   
Intercept -8.14 0.08 
 (-2.83) (0.94) 
   
Level of 1-year Treas. 2.26  
 (5.84)  
   
Change in 1-year Treas.  2.32 
  (6.17) 
   
AR(1) parameter 0.95 -0.08 
 (47.30) (-1.07) 
   
R-squared 0.88 0.16 
Durbin Watson 2.12 2.01 
Observations 196 195 
 
 
 
 4. THE COMPARATIVE RETURNS OF CLOSED-END FUNDS AND 
ALTERNATIVE ASSETS 
  
 The positive relationship between interest rates and Dt levels is consistent with the 
investor sentiment model presented by Flynn (2002).  In that model, if interest rates rise, 
then closed-end fund returns look comparatively less attractive to the small investors who 
dominate US closed-end fund markets.  This causes closed-end fund prices to fall relative 
to portfolio values, whose prices aren’t affected by the sentiment of closed-end fund 
investors because the markets for the assets in fund portfolios are dominated by large 
institutional shareholders who hire rational, professional asset managers (Lee, Shleifer, 
and Thaler 1991.)  The result is that when interest rates rise, closed-end fund prices fall 
relative to NAVs, causing Dt levels to increase. 
 
 
 5. CONCLUSION  
 
 In US data covering 1985-2001, closed-end fund Dt levels vary positively with 
interest rates.  The positive relationship between the variables is consistent with the 
intuition of Flynn (2002), but it may only be a coincidence given that for US funds prior 
to 1985 and for UK funds from 1991-1997, no relationship between Dt and interest rates 
is found in the literature.   
 
 That being said, the positive relationship should likely be taken seriously for four  
reasons. First, finance professionals are aware of it and tell their clients to trade on it 
(Bush 2001.)  Second, the post-1985 period contains vastly more funds than the pre-1985 
period, so that the inability to find a relationship between Dt and interest rates during the 
earlier period may have simply been due to insufficient data.  Third, the huge interest rate 
volatility of 1970s may have obscured the positive relationship between interest rates and 
Dt levels during the 1965-1985 period studied by Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler (1991) and 
Pontiff (1996).  Fourth, the post-1985 period studied here represents a new era for small 
investors in the US, with both mutual funds and closed-end funds growing hugely more 
popular and attracting vastly more attention.  It may be that the positive relationship 
between Dt levels and interest rates is a new phenomenon intimately related to the ability 
of small investors to rapidly re-allocate their investment capital in reaction to changes in 
interest rates.  Since UK closed-end funds are dominated by institutional investors rather 
than small investors, this would also explain why Gemmill and Thomas (2002) find no 
relationship between Dt and interest rates in UK data during their 1991-1997 sample 
period. 
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